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Abstract 
 Since the 11 September 2001 attack on the U.S and subsequent wars Afghanistan has 
become at the forefront of the global agenda. The U.S involvement in Afghanistan is mainly 
to defeat al Qaeda and dismantle the Taliban regime that harbored al Qaeda. After nearly 
twelve years of war the U.S although appears to be successful in weakening Al Qaeda but not 
able to destroy the group. Now the U.S and its allies are planning to pull out of Afghanistan. 
Following the plan to withdraw all NATO combatant troops from Afghanistan by the end of 
2014 there is a growing  concern  for the weak U.S established Karzai government in 
particular and Afghanistan at large.  This paper inquiries into what the war achieved, how the 
NATO forces will pull out of Afghanistan and what awaits Afghanistan after the NATO 
withdrawal.  
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Introduction 
 The U.S administration’s contradictory statements and the mismatch between the U.S 
administration’s rhetoric and facts on the ground are the bases for my inquiry. The U.S 
administration, on one hand, claim to significantly dismantle its main adversary Taliban and 
that it is already established around 300,000 Afghanistan troops ready to take  the security 
responsibility from the NATO forces completely by the end of 2014.  However, on the other 
hand, the U.S administration is planning to provide a negotiated settlement with Taliban. So 
far, Taliban is reluctant to negotiate, which shows the power balance to the side of Taliban. In 
addition, the NATO and the Afghan troops hardly control areas beyond Kabul. Thus, this 
term attempts to unravel the above contradictions.   
 The aim of this paper is to examine the NATO achievement in Afghanistan especially 
related to the counterinsurgency program.  The paper also attempts to identify alternative exit 
routes NATO is considering to transport its large cargo out of Afghanistan in the coming 
years.  In addition, I attempt to analyze possible future security scenarios in the post NATO 
Afghanistan.  The methodological approach I used in this study is qualitative methodology. 
 Qualitative methodology is more compatible to address the objectives .The major 
source is secondary sources that include documents, scholarly articles, news analysis, books 
etc. The selected method to study the topic is document analysis. The scope of the paper 
covers mainly the current developments unfolding in Afghanistan in relation to security. The 
NATO’s remaining years are significant to understand the overall strategy of the U.S, as super 
power, war on terror that shapes its global security strategies. I organize this paper into five 
major parts. The first section discuss about the causes for the U.S-NATO involvement in 
Afghanistan. The second part is about the belligerents and the third part is about NATO’s 
achievements. The fourth section discusses about the NATO pull out strategy and the fifth 
part is about the post NATO Afghanistan. Finally, I incorporated a brief conclusion.     
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Causes of the War 
 According to many observers there are three major causes for the U.S led NATO 
military engagement in Afghanistan. These are security, geopolitical and economic. The 
immediate cause for the U.S engagement in Afghanistan, in 2001, is related to national 
security matters. The U.S-NATO military campaign was focused to dismantle the Taliban 
regime that was harboring al Qaida. Afghanistan and the Taliban regime were labeled as 
rogue state and fertile ground for terrorism. Since 2001, Afghanistan becomes a top U.S 
security priority. (Birku, 2011:22)  
 The U.S army went to Afghanistan to achieve four major military objectives. These 
are “capturing Osama bin Laden, capturing Mullah Umar, closing down al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere and releasing U.S prisoners in Afghanistan” (Jackson and Towel, 
2006:176). Even though, initially the U.S major objective in Afghanistan was to destroy al 
Qaida and Taliban, it gradually adopted the task of nation building. The later task of nation 
building in Afghanistan by the U.S and its allies is unsuccessful so far, rather it made things 
more complicated in both local and regional politico-security spectrum. I will return to the 
latter point in detail in the topics to come.  
 Afghanistan has a “distinct geographical connection between Central Asia and the 
Middle East” (Rosén, 2008: 82). More to this, “the U.S is closely watching the co-operative 
framework between Russia, China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan [under Shanghai Cooperation Organization]” (Birku: 24).  The rivalry to 
dominate Central Asia between Russia, China and the U.S made Afghanistan geopolitically 
significant. In addition, the exiting tension between Iran and the U.S contributes for the 
strategically significance of Afghanistan in the eyes of the two states. Such strategic 
importance seems to have a vital place in the U.S desire to extend its presence in Afghanistan.  
 Afghanistan is also an important pass way to the economically reach region of Central 
Asia. The U.S desire to build oil/gas pipeline across Central Asia, according to some 
observers, is related to the U.S engagement in Afghanistan. As Birku cited from Yechury 
Afghanistan is vital “from energy stand point that stems from its geographic position as a 
potential transit route for oil and natural gas export from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea”. 
(Birku: 27)    
 
The Belligerents  
 The major actors in the Afghan war theater can be classified into two groups. These 
are NATO and Taliban. NATO represents all member states and international forces involved 
on the side of the U.S. Taliban; the name represents many groups that resist the foreign 
involvement in Afghanistan.  
 
NATO 
 Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the U.S administration 
immediately categorized Afghanistan as the major security threat. In addition, the attack 
“prompted Allies to launch Operation Active Endeavour, to adopt the Military Concept for 
Defense against Terrorism (MC472) and to initiate various capability and institutional 
changes”(NATO,2012:2).  The U.S started air bombardment of Afghanistan on 7 October 
2001 supported by the ‘Coalition of the willing’. The International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) established the Afghan Transitional Government on December 22, 2001. Initially, the 
ISAF had a limited mandate of peacekeeping in Kabul and its surrounding areas “to provide 
security for the interim Afghan government and UN agencies operating in the city” (Zisk, 
winter 2002-2003:36). In 2003, NATO overtook all the security responsibility in Afghanistan 
from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the United States.  (Hansen; Toff 
and Wivel, 2009:84)  
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 The U.S as a primary player in the Afghan theatre is working with 49 different states 
and the Afghan army as well as government (Katzman, 2012:24). NATO immediately after 
the attacks on U.S announced its Article 5184 for the first time ever. Then Afghanistan 
becomes NATO’s first mission outside of Europe. In October 2011 the number of 
international forces was about “130,638 military personnel deployed as part of ISAF, from 49 
contributing nations” (Taylor, 2011:13)   
 According to Minuto-Rizzo (2010), there is no comparable international organization 
other than NATO to handle such a huge responsibility. The UN lacks the efficiency even if it 
has enormous legitimacy. The responsibility among the NATO member states and partner 
states is distributed unevenly as shown in the Table below.  
States No. troops States No. troops States No. troops 
Albania 286 Germany 5000 Poland 2580 
Armenia 126 Greece 153 Portugal 140 
Australia 1550 Hungary 415 Romania 1873 
Austria 3 Iceland 4 Singapore 39 
Azerbaijan 94 Ireland 7 Slovakia 309 
Belgium 520 Italy 3952 Slovenia 77 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
55 Jordan 0 Spain 1526 
Bulgaria 597 Republic of 
Korea 
350 Sweden 500 
Canada 529 Latvia 174 Macedonia 163 
Croatia 317 Lithuania 236 Tonga 55 
Czech 
Republic 
623 Luxembourg 11 Turkey 1840 
Denmark 750 Malaysia 46 Ukraine 23 
El Salvador 24 Mongolia 114 United Arab 
Emirates 
35 
Estonia 159 Montenegro 39 United 
Kingdom 
9500 
Finland 156 Netherlands 183 United States 90000 
France 3932 New Zealand 188   
Georgia 937 Norway 429   
    TOTAL 130,638 
Source: ISAF Headquarters, 18 October 2011 (Taylor, 2011: 13-14) 
 
Taliban 
 Different groups in Afghanistan organize the insurgency against the NATO forces 
under the name Taliban. However, there are many versions of the Taliban. Among the 
different versions of the Taliban, Quetta Shura Taliban (under Mullah Umar), Hikmatyar 
Taliban (under Gulbuddin Hikmatyar), and Haqqani Taliban (under Jalaludin Haqqani) have 
been prominent. In addition, other insurgency groups like al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan operate in Afghanistan. (Katzman, 2012) There are some differences among the 
above groups. Some of them have a global agenda whereas others focus on local matters only. 
In addition, the area they are active differs. For instance, the Haqqani is more active in east of 
Afghanistan, whereas the Hikmatyar is more active in the south.  
 The insurgency groups also have many similarities. Among these, their ethnic group is 
the one. Most of the insurgency belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group. The Pashtun people 
inhabit eastern and southern part of Afghanistan and western part of Pakistan. The Pashtun 
people “pride themselves on never having paid taxes to any sovereign and never having their 
lands, which they consider veiled, or purdah, conquered”. (Johnson and Mason, 2008:51) 
                                                          
184 Article 5 of the NATO treaty states ‘that an armed attack on one or more of [the allies] in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all’ 
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Similarly, they all are Muslims. Moreover, often they work together in a coordinated manner. 
In addition, it is reported al Qaeda has a close relation with both Hikmatyar and Quetta Shura 
Taliban.  
 
NATO: ‘Achievements’ 
 The achievements of NATO could be measured in terms of its objectives. As a 
security organization, its responsibility largely lies on security matters, specifically running 
the counterinsurgency185 policy. The major achievement of the U.S was death of Osama bin 
Laden, the chief architect of the 9/11 attack, inside Pakistan. However, the counterinsurgency 
was not successful. The chief conniver of the counterinsurgency strategy, in Afghanistan, 
General Mc Chrystal outlined the program in the following manner, on August 30, 2006,That 
the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population rather than to focus on 
searching out and combating Taliban concentrations. Indicators of success such as ease of 
road travel, participation in local shuras, and normal life for families are more significant than 
counts of enemy fighters killed. 
 That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced, comprehensive 
counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban momentum within 12-18 months. 
About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops (beyond those approved by the Obama 
Administration strategy review in March 2009) would be needed to have the greatest chance 
for his strategy’s success. (Katzman, 2012:21) 
 There was, however, intense debate about the wisdom behind this surge. For instance, 
the dramatic increase in the number of troops was highly criticized by the Defense Secretary 
of the time Robert Gates. Gates was worried about the rise in the number of U.S troops 
because it might create a “sense of occupation [on the side of Afghans] that could prove 
counter-productive” (Ibid).  After tense debate in the U.S president Obama announced on 
December1, 2009: 
        That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent (bringing U.S.levels 
close to 100,000) to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the capacity of 
Afghanistan’s security forces and government. 
 That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of the 
stabilization effort and a corresponding beginning of a drawdown of U.S. force levels. (Ibid) 
 Nevertheless, the U.S-NATO led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is largely 
considered as a failure. The counterinsurgency, the skeptics fear leads the U.S into a 
‘quagmire’. The aspiration to win ‘hearts and mind’ was not successful as expected. The U.S 
soldiers’ misconduct186 and the indiscriminate drone attacks made the U.S and the 
international forces more unpopular in Afghanistan. Likewise, the other objective of the 
counterinsurgency, i.e. ‘clear, hold, and build’, failed to materialize in Afghanistan, because 
of stiff insurgency resistance and limited NATO troops on the ground to accomplish such a 
task. NATO/US and the Afghan Army have a very limited control over much of Afghanistan. 
(Branch and Wood, 2010: 3) Moreover, there is a limited trust between the NATO forces and 
Afghan forces. In contrary, counterinsurgency highly requires the close collaboration between 
the foreign forces and local forces, both police and the army.  
 Although, there is a limited progress in the area of nation building the international 
forces in Afghanistan have some success story when comes to socio-economic areas. In 
particular, the women involvement in public affairs showed a remarkable increase since the 
NATO involvement in Afghanistan (Chishti, 2010:254).  
                                                          
185 Counterinsurgency was unpopular among the U.S political circle since the Vietnam War. However, it was 
reintroduced during the Iraq War (II) in 2004. From Iraq, it transferred to Afghanistan theatre in 2009. 
186 There are large numbers of accusation on the U.S troops in Afghanistan such as the burring of the Quran, 
denigrating the dead, killing of civilians etc. This significantly reduced the U.S image in Afghanistan and across 
the Muslim world. 
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NATO Pull Out  
 The NATO is looking to pull out of Afghanistan as much as possible with ‘a minimum 
of exit cost and a toll in lives’ (Daxner, 2011:71). In the Lisbon NATO Summit, November 9-
10, 2010, member states agreed, “that the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 
and would be completed by the end of 2014” (Katzman: 21). The pull out of the U.S troops, 
biggest contributor, begun in July 2011. In mid-2011, the U.S troops stationed numbered 
around 99,000. However, in May 2012 the number of U.S troops dropped to 90,000.  Other 
states are also putting deadlines for their troops pull out such as France, Canada, Australia and 
others. Both the absence of progress in Afghanistan and domestic politics in each of the states 
seems the reason for the early exit.  
 Nevertheless, exit from Afghanistan is for the NATO forces are getting difficult. The 
pull out strategy of the U.S seems to suffer a big blow after Pakistan closed the road to 
Afghanistan. Now what is worrying NATO is “how to leave Afghanistan without losses rather 
than when to leave” (Burlinova, 2010:1). The Pakistani route to Afghanistan was the major 
supply route to the NATO forces. However, Pakistan closed its doors after U.S air attack 
killed around 24 Pakistan troops stationed near the Afghanistan border in November 2011. 
Since then high level U.S, officials are considering alternative route to facilitate relatively 
easy and less costly withdrawal. Recently, the Foreign Secretary Clinton signed a treaty with 
three Central Asian states for the same purpose. Although Pakistan and the U.S have already 
amended their broken relation the possibility of weakening relation remain imminent.  This 
appears mainly true because on the Pakistan side the U.S refusal to halt repeated drone attacks 
on the Pakistan soil could be a deal breaker. The U.S in its part continued to criticize Pakistan, 
especially the intelligence, support to some insurgence groups in Afghanistan. An allegation 
Pakistan has been categorically denying.  
 Despite all these, the alternatives are less attractive compare to the Pakistani route in 
terms of both safety and cost. The international forces “has [estimated] 122,000 shipping 
containers and 70,000 vehicles in Afghanistan” the transportation of such a huge load create 
an enormous logistical challenge to the NATO forces (Merey, 2012:2). Compare to the other 
routes the Pakistani (southern) route is cheaper. However, Pakistan closed the route because 
of the incident indicated above. Hence, the NATO forces are obliged to search for alternative 
routes to transport their cargo out of Afghanistan.  Alternatives to the Pakistan or the Southern 
route are the following: 
A) the Northern route – the transportation of NATO equipment’s via “former Soviet republics 
in Central Asia such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan”(Ibid) and Kirgizstan. Then the cargos will 
transfer to train to reach a port. These states will demand a higher fee for the passage.  
B) Air- very expensive and there are huge loads that cannot be transported through the air.   
C) Iran- ‘not an option’ because of the unfriendly relation Iran has with the U.S and other 
NATO member states.   
 The NATO powers expressed their desire to take back significant amount of the 
military hard ware they were using in Afghanistan. However, given the difficult situation 
NATO forces are in, they will be forced to leave behind large amount of weaponries behind. 
These weaponries if they fell on Taliban or al Qaeda, hand they might be used to attack the 
West. These weapons, leftovers, could create power imbalance and exacerbate the already 
volatile security condition in Afghanistan. 
 
Post-NATO Afghanistan  
 As the foreign forces preparing to pull out of Afghanistan, many are asking what they 
are living behind. And as stated above, although there are some gains made by the help of 
foreign troops, Afghanistan still remain largely insecure where “ insurgency still operates, 
poverty still festers and there is nothing resembling a genuine rule of law” (Ibid). Now it is 
accepted, it is nearly impossible to set up the envisioned ‘liberal nation state’ in Afghanistan. 
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What the U.S seems to achieve is ‘a cold peace’ because it become unattainable to win the 
war. In this section, I try to outline different scenarios concerning the future of Afghanistan 
after the NATO forces withdrawal. 
 Some scholars proposed a federal system that allocates significant power to the 
regional players, because the central authority already has no strong authority. Some even 
suggested dividing the Afghan providences along ethnic lines. However, in both cases it is 
unlikely to ensure stability in Afghanistan. Others are proposing for involving Taliban in the 
Afghan government. However, this also has its own challenges. First, the NATO and their 
Afghan partners need to make ‘a significant compromise’, and this could be considered as a 
defeat. Second, most prominent Taliban actors are not willing to work with the present 
arrangements. The attempt to broker a deal with the Taliban failed recently after the U.S 
troops went on a killing rampage on civilians. Others are indicating, the possibility of putting 
Afghanistan under UN protectorate. However, this is also hardly enables to halt the civil war 
in the country.  
 On the latest summit on Afghanistan, the Chicago Summit May 20-21, 2012, the 
NATO members’ states and their partner reaffirmed their commitment to the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan. The Chicago Summit’s general principles indicated, “[O]ur efforts are part of 
the broader engagement of the International Community as outlined by the Kabul Conference 
in July 2010, the Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation which was launched in 
November 2011 and the Bonn Conference in December 2011”. (NATO, 2012: 1) The 
establishment of Taliban ‘contact office’ in Doha, Qatar created tension between the Karzai 
government, which felt sidelined, and the U.S. 
 Recently, the Western states are experiencing economic difficulty. As a result, many 
doubt the full realization of these commitments to Afghanistan. The U.S. has repeatedly 
indicated its desire to transfer its Afghan responsibility to some other international body. The 
Chicago Summit main aim was Afghanistan. The Chicago Summit was expected to “finalize 
the plan to transfer all security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. The 
summit will also establish enduring political and financial commitment to Afghanistan” 
(Coffey, 2012: 1). To help the Karzai government firmly stand on its feet seems to require 
enormous capital and strong dedication. However, both are missing in Afghanistan. With the 
international forces living behind very corrupt government, ill-trained soldiers, aid and drug 
driven economy the return of Taliban regime to power seems inevitable.  All the gains the U.S 
and NATO are proud of could be lost in a few weeks, if the Afghan government does not 
continue to get the assistance.   
 I suspect in the early years after the NATO forces withdrawal Taliban will regain 
significant position, if not all, in much of Afghanistan. However, securing stability and order 
remain a challenge. In addition, the West will continue to support some groups and Pakistan 
might also fund some other groups. Therefore, I fear a Somalia like situation might surface in 
Afghanistan.  At worst a protracted civil war will loom across much of Afghanistan with no 
strong central authority and foreign powers covert involvement.  
 
Conclusion 
 Afghanistan is significant to understand where the U.S. is heading on its war on terror. 
US-NATO forces were successful in the initial phase of the Afghan war. They secured a 
quick victory against al Qaeda and Taliban forces. U.S targeted assassination was also 
successfully eliminated prominent al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. In addition, the NATO 
forces were successful in securing main diplomatic quarters of Kabul. 
 Nevertheless, since the launch of the counterinsurgency strategy, in 2006, the 
insurgencies become powerful. The counterinsurgency’s main objective of nation building 
fails to realize. NATO and its allies could not continue the war, agreed to leave Afghanistan 
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in 2014.    Hence, NATO’s exit strategy and the future fate Afghanistan becomes a major 
global agenda. 
In general, Afghanistan showed the limits of the Western military powers. The U.S and its 
allies are now forced to reconsider their overall strategy on the so-called war on terror.  The 
Afghanistan they are leaving behind may be much more a security threat than before the 
invasion. Today al Qaeda is proliferated in many parts of the world. In addition, the problem 
in Afghanistan is already spilling over to neighboring states like Pakistan. However, the 
overall impact of the NATO involvement in Afghanistan is yet to be seen in the years to 
come.    
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